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NOTES
During the past term, the Burger Court has decided a number of equal
protection cases using an intermediate standard of review. This emerging
standard lies somewhere between the minimal rationality and strict scrutiny
tests of the more conventional two-tier model.
The following Notes analyze cases which are representative of the Bur-
ger Court's recent equal protection decisions where it appears that the
Court's sense of fairness of the governmental action involved is the new
standard of review.
NO DOGS, CATS, OR VOLUNTARY FAMILIES
ALLOWED-VILLAGE OF BELLE TERRE v. BORAAS
The Village of Belle Terre is a small community of approximately 220
homes on Long Island, New York, zoned exclusively for single-family
dwellings.' The zoning ordinance's definition of "family" restricts groups
consisting of more than two people not related by blood, adoption or mar-
riage, from living together as a single housekeeping unit. 2
This provision was the subject of a challenge in Village of Belle Terre
v. Boraas.s The Dickmans, owners of a house within the village, leased
it in December 1971, to Michael Truman who was later joined by Bruce
Boraas and four others. All of the tenants were students at a nearby State
1. Village of Belle Terre, N.Y., Building Zone Ordinance art. I, § D-1.34a
(1971). This ordinance defines a "single-family dwelling" as:
A detached house consisting of or intended to be occupied as a residence
by one family only, as family is hereafter defined. In no case shall a lodg-
ing house, boarding house, fraternity house, sorority house or multiple dwell-
ing be classified or construed as a one family dwelling.
Id.
2. The ordinance defines "family" as:
One or more persons related by blood, adoption, or marriage, living and
cooking together as a single housekeeping unit, exclusive of household serv-
ants. A number of persons but not exceeding two (2) living and cooking
together as a single housekeeping unit though not related by blood, adop-
tion, or marriage shall be deemed to constitute a family.
Id. art. I, § D-1.35a (1971). See also What Constitutes a "Family" within Meaning
of Zoning Regulations or. Restrictive Covenant, Annot., 172 A.L.R. 1172 (1948).
3. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
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University and none were related by blood, marriage or adoption. The
Village served the Dickmans with an "Order to Remedy Violations" of
the ordinance, whereupon the Dickmans and three tenants brought an ac-
tion in U.S. District Court seeking injunctive relief and a declaratory judg-
ment regarding the constitutionality of the provision. 4 While the district
court denied such relief,5 the court of appeals, in a two to one decision,
reversed, finding the ordinance to be a violation of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment.6
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court,7 the appellees chal-
lenged the ordinance's validity on principally the same grounds relied on
in the court of appeals; that the ordinance's classification, which was based
on traditional family relationships, impinged on their fundamental rights
of travel, association, and privacy8 and violated the equal protection
clause. In a seven to two decision,9 the Court upheld the ordinance, find-
ing it rationally related to the permissible state objective of land use
planning pursuant to the needs of families,10 and finding no violation of
any fundamental rights of the appellees. 11
4. Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 810 (2d Cir. 1973). The
court notes that the action was brought in the district court under the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1973):
seeking preliminary and permanent injunctive relief against enforcement of
the ordinance and a declaratory judgment invalidating as unconstitutional
the prohibition against residential occupancy by more than two persons 'not
related by blood, adoption, or marriage.'
5. Boras v. Village of Belle Terre, 367 F. Supp. 136 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). The
court said it was not unconstitutional because the students live cooperatively under
zoning ordinances in other nearby communities. Id. at 147-49.
6. 476 F.2d at 808. The court said, "[wie hold that since the discriminatory
classification is unsupported by any rational basis consistent with permissible zoning
law objectives, it transgresses the equal protection clause."
7. 476 F.2d 806, prob. juris. noted, 414 U.S. 907 (1973).
8. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
9. Id. The seven majority justices were Chief Justice Burger, Justices Douglas,
Stewart, Powell, Blackmun, White, and Rehnquist. The dissenters were Justices
Brennan and Marshall.
10. Id. at 9. The Court articulated the guidelines used to measure the validity
of legislation involved in cases like the one before it:
We deal with economic and social legislation where legislatures have his-
torically drawn lines which we respect against the charge of violation of the
equal protection clause if the law be "reasonable, not arbitrary" [quoting
F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)] and bears "a
rational relationship to a [permissible] state objective," Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
Id. at 8.
11. Id. at 7-8. The three fundamental rights raised by the appellees, which have
been previously recognized by the Court, were: right of association, NAACP v. Ala-
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The history of the Supreme Court is marked by few cases which involve
the validity of local zoning ordinances. Indeed, Belle Terre ends a hiatus
of forty-six years during which the highest court has been silent in the zon-
ing area. While the last zoning decision before Belle Terre was in 1928,
Nectow v. City of Cambridge,12 the most significant decision occurred two
years prior in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty.13 Euclid sustained a
zoning ordinance which classified an area into six categories, each category
determining the type of building which could be constructed as well as its
height and land area. The Court found the ordinance a proper exercise
of the state's police power, and said it would defer to the local legislature
if the "classification for zoning purposes was fairly debatable.' 1 4  The
Euclid Court's attitude of deference to the local legislature has become the
means whereby subsequent local zoning legislation has been upheld.15
The rationale used in Belle Terre to uphold the zoning ordinance's defini-
tion of a "family" refurbished the Euclid decision.
The Supreme Court not only gave vitality to traditional zoning law by
re-emphasizing Euclid, but it did so without giving commensurate weight
to fundamental rights of the appellees. In refusing to recognize these as-
sociational rights, the opinion failed to offer any reasoned elaboration on
bama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); right to travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969); and the right of privacy, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
12. 277 U.S. 183 (1928). The Court in Nectow dealt with the specific applica-
tion of a zoning ordinance challenged by the plaintiff in error as a deprivation of
property without due process in violation of the fourteenth amendment. The Court
found the ordinance as applied unconstitutional. Id. at 188-89.
13. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
14. Id. at 388.
15. In Euclid, an owner of unimproved land challenged the zoning ordinance,
claiming its building restrictions operated to reduce the normal value of his property
and therefore deprived him of liberty and property without due process. The follow-
ing passages from the opinion illustrate the Court's evaluation of the purpose and
weight of the state police power.
The ordinance now under review, and all similar laws and regulations, must
find their justification in some aspect of the police power, asserted for the
public welfare.
Id. at 387.
If the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly
debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control.
Id. at 388, citing Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292, 294 (1924).
[Ilt must be said before the ordinance can be declared unconstitutional,
that such provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no sub-
stantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.
Id. at 395. Accord, Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 274 U.S. 325 (1927); Cusack
Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 530-31 (1917); Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
197 U.S. 11, 30-31 (1905).
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the issue.16 The majority reached its decision through application of tra-
ditional equal protection theory. In contrast, the court of appeals had re-
lied on the new "flexible" equal protection approach 17 which the Supreme
Court itself seems to have sanctionedis without ever clearly articulating
it.'9 Belle Terre's re-establishment of the Euclid traditional zoning theory
coupled with the failure to recognize the appellee's associational rights
marks a victory for exclusionary zoning.
This Note will analyze the Supreme Court's refusal to recognize the as-
sociational rights of individuals when confronted with traditional type zon-
ing legislation. It will include a brief examination of state police power,
as well as discussion of recent state and federal cases similar to Belle
Terre. The Note will also examine the difference between the equal pro-
tection analysis applied by the court of appeals and the Supreme Court.
VALIDITY OF STATE LEGISLATION
The Police Power Argument
States have historically defended the validity of their legislative enact-
ments by asserting that the legislation was "reasonable" and "not arbi-
trary" and was a legitimate exercise of their police power. 20 An early
definition illustrating the expanse of state police power was advanced in
Barbier v. Connolly, where the Court described it as the power "to pre-
scribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and
good order of the people .... -21 A more recent and expansive definition
of police power was offered by Justice Douglas in Berman v. Parker,
16. 416 U.S. 1, 7-9. See also note 11 supra.
17. 476 F.2d 806, 814 (1973). For an analysis of the court of appeals decision
and its treatment of the new test of equal protection, see Note, Up the Down-Sliding
Scale: Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre and Equal Protection Assault on Restrictive
Definitions of "Family" in Zoning Ordinances, 49 NoTRE DAME LAW. 428 (1973).
18. The cases in which some aspect of the new test can be seen are Kahn v.
Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528
(1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715
(1972); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); James v. Strange,
407 U.S. 128 (1972); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71 (1971).
19. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,
86 HAxv. L. REV. 1 (1972); Development in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAiv.
L. REv. 1065, 1120 (1969).
20. For a general discussion of state police power, see B. Schwartz, Constitu-
tional Law: A Textbook 42-46, 166-91 (1972).
21. 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885).
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Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order-
these are some of the more conspicuous examples of the traditional applica-
tion of the police power to municipal affairs. Yet they merely illustrate
the scope of the power and do not delimit it (emphasis added).22
These definitions taken alone show the discretion afforded states in enact-
ing legislation and suggest judicial deference when courts are asked to pass
on their validity. The Supreme Court has gone as far as saying there is
a presumption in favor of the legislation's validity.23
The Court's hands-off attitude is the result of its assumption that local
legislative bodies are more knowledgeable of the relevant facts and thus
are better equipped to determine whether particular legislation is neces-
sary.24 However, the courts will interfere if the legislation exceeds consti-
tutional limitations.25 The following is an illustration of the criteria which
the courts will often use in judging constitutionality:
mhe regulation must not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, the
means selected must have a real and substantial relation to the object sought
to be attained, and the regulation or proscription must be reasonably calcu-
lated to meet the evil. .... 26
In particular, this standard has frequently been used in zoning regulation
cases to invalidate statutes similar to the one involved in Belle Terre.
27
22. 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954); accord, California Auto. Ass'n v. Maloney, 341 U.S.
105 (1951); Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 111 (1911).
23. In Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), the Court said, "Every pre-
sumption is to be indulged in favor of the validity of the statute [citing Mugler
v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887)]." Id. at 668. See Dennis v. Village of Tonka
Bay, 156 F.2d 672 (8th Cir. 1946).
24. 'In Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917), the Court deter-
mined the validity of an ordinance regulating the erection of billboards and noted:
while this court has refrained from any attempt to define with precision
the limits of the police power, yet its disposition is to favor the validity of
laws relating to matters completely within the territory of the state enacting
them and it so reluctantly disagrees with the local legislative authority ...
Id. at 530-31. An even stronger cry for judicial deference can be seen in Radice
v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924):
Where the consitutional validity of a statute depends upon the existence of
facts, courts must be cautious about reaching a conclusion respecting them
contrary to that reached by the legislature; and if the question of what the
facts establish be a fairly debatable one, it is not permissible for the judge
to set up his opinion in respect of it against the opinion of the lawmaker.
Id. at 294. See also Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 510
(1937); Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 433 (1935).
25. See, e.g., Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. State Highway Comm'n, 294 U.S.
613, 622 (1935); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Buchanan
v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 74 (1917).
26. Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 251, 281 A.2d
513, 518 (1971); accord, Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405 (1935).
27. Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 281 A.2d 513
[Vol. 24:784
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An examination of the principal decisions in the family zoning area
prior to Belle Terre seems to indicate a trend towards preferential treat-
ment of individual rights over restrictive zoning ordinances (while some
cases have found the restrictive legislation valid under a traditional Euclid
approach).
FAMILY ZONING PRIOR To Belle Terre
State Cases
Most state court decisions have found invalid legislation which has de-
fined "family" so as to exclude persons unrelated by blood, marriage or
adoption. 28 State police power arguments are muted in the face of consti-
tutional limitations or when confronted with other judicial devices which
had the same effect. 29
In City of Des Plaines v. Trottner,80 the Illinois Supreme Court ex-
amined an ordinance which contained a provision restrictively defining
family as:
one or more persons each related to the other by blood (or adoption or
marriage), together with such relatives' respective spouses, who are living
together in a single dwelling and maintaining a common household. A
"family" includes any domestic servants and not more than one gratuitous
guest residing with said "family."31
The court recognized the zoning objectives of protecting the stability of
the neighborhood and property values as well as insulating the neighbor-
hood from traffic and parking problems. Similar objectives were recog-
nized in Belle Terre, but there the Court refused to conclude, as did the
Trottner court, that to say that property values would decline and traffic
problems result from allowing unrelated persons the right to live together
(1971); Gabe Collins Realty, Inc. v. City of Margate City, 112 N.J. Super. 341, 271
A.2d 430 (App. Div. 1970).
28. Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 281 A.2d 513
(1971); Gabe Collins Realty, Inc. v. City of Margate City, 112 N.J. Super. 341, 271
A.2d 430 (App. Div. 1970); City of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34 11. 2d 432, 438,
216 N.E.2d 116, 120 (1966); Marino v. Mayor and Council of Norwood, 77 N.J.
Super. 587, 187 A.2d 217 (L. Div. 1963). Contra, City of Newark v. Johnson, 70
N.J. Super. 381, 175 A.2d 500 (L. Div. 1961).
29. In City of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34 Il. 2d 432, 438, 216 N.E.2d 116, 120
(1966), the court invalidated the ordinance as impermissible zoning legislation be-
cause it was beyond the scope of subject matter authorized by the General Assembly.
See note 33 and accompanying text infra.
30. 34 Ill. 2d 432, 216 N.E.2d 116 (1966).
31. Id. at 433-34, 216 N.E.2d at 117 (1966).
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is an oversimplification and in no manner "reflects a universal truth." 2
Although Trottner failed to reach the constitutional questions involved, its
attitude toward the legislation can be seen in the choice of words used
to invalidate the ordinance on other grounds.
The General Assembly has not specifically authorized the adoption of
zoning ordinances that penetrate so deeply as this one does into the internal
composition of a single housekeeping unit.83
Family zoning legislation in New Jersey has been extensive, culminating
in a favorable treatment toward unrelated individuals. While City of
Newark v. New Jersey34 upheld the validity of a restrictive family zoning
ordinance as not unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory, the following
cases, Marino v. Mayor and Council of Norwood,3 5 and Gabe Collins
Realty Inc. v. City of Margate City,36 invalidated ordinances similar to
the one involved in City of Newark. The New Jersey Supreme Court
finally spoke out on the family zoning issue in Kirsch Holding Co. v.
Borough of Manasquan,3 7 where it invalidated a restrictive family ordi-
ance. It was noted that not only would the ordinance prohibit a small
unrelated group of widows or widowers from occupying a resort cottage,
but it would equally prohibit two unrelated judges from doing so. 38 The
court found the ordinances "so sweepingly excessive" and "legally unrea-
sonable, that they must fall in their entirety. '3 9 This case, at least in
theory, settled the future of restrictive family zoning ordinances in New
Jersey.
32. The court recognized that "not all family units are internally stable and well-
disciplined" and that "family groups with two or more cars are not unfamiliar." Id.
at 437-38, 216 N.E.2d at 119.
33. Id. at 438, 216 N.E.2d at 119.
34. 70 N.J. Super. 381, 175 A.2d 500 (L. Div. 1961). The ordinance affected
children who were placed in homes by the Board of Child Welfare but were not re-
lated by "blood, marriage, or adoption" to the residents of the homes. Even in this
emotionally charged situation the court upheld the ordinance.
35. 77 N.J. Super. 587, 187 A.2d 217 (L. Div. 1963). The court allowed an un-
married couple to live together by holding the ordinance which restricted "family"
to relationships of "blood or marriage" inapplicable upon a finding of a bona fide
housekeeping unit.
36. 112 N.J. Super. 341, 271 A.2d 430 (App. Div. 1970). The typical "family"
ordinance was designed to restrict the summer rental of houses to groups of men and
women who failed to meet the relation requirements of the ordinance. The ordi-
nance's purpose was to prevent noise and other disturbances.
37. 59 N.J. 241, 281 A.2d 513 (1971).
38. Id. at 248, 281 A.2d at 517.
39. Id. at 252, 281 A.2d at 518.
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Federal Cases
The two federal cases prior to Belle Terre in this area of zoning demon-
strate conflicting results. In Palo Alto Tenants Union v. Morgan,40 the
definition of "family" 41 survived an equal protection and due process chal-
lenge, when the court found that the ordinance did not infringe upon any
fundamental interests of the plaintiffs. The court said zoning laws could
properly control population density and -that this alone might be enough
to justify ordinances which limit the number of unrelated individuals living
together. 42
The more recent federal court case to deal with a restrictive family zon-
ing ordinance is Timberlake v. Kenkel.43 There the ordinance defined
family so as to preclude occupancy of a single family dwelling by four or
more unrelated individuals. The court found the ordinance unconstitu-
tional as a violation of the equal protection clause.
The district court in Timberlake, like the court of appeals in Belle Terre,
applied the more "flexible" equal protection approach and not the rigid
"two-tiered" formula. 44 In both cases the courts cited a number of recent
Supreme Court decisions to justify the new approach, which they believed
to be more equitable than the old equal protection formula. However,
the Supreme Court in Belle Terre failed to recognize the new approach
and adopted the "two-tiered" model. The following section will analyze
the difference in equal protection treatment and the possible reasons for
the Supreme Court's return to old equal protection.
Belle Terre EQUAL PROTECTION
In challenging legislation on the grounds that it violates the equal pro-
tection clause, focus is directed toward the classification implicit in the
40. 321 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Cal. 1970); aff'd mem., 487 F.2d 883 (9th Cir.
1973).
41. Family was defined as "one person living alone, or two or more persons
related 'by blood, marriage, or legal adoption, or a group not exceeding four persons
living as a single housekeeping unit." Id. at 909.
42. Id. at 912.
43. 369 F. Supp. 456 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
44. In Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973), the ap-
peals court recognized the Supreme Court's move from the ". . . rigid dichotomy
sometimes described as the 'two-tiered' formula toward a more flexible and equitable
approach. . . . Under this approach the test for application of the Equal Protection
Clause is whether the legislative classification is in fact substantially related to the
object of the statute." Id. at 814. In Timberlake v. Kenkel the flexible approach
is also adopted by the court as an acceptable equal protection formula, 369 F. Supp.
at 464.
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legislation. In order to determine whether the classification is a means
to discriminate against a particular group of individuals unconstitutionally,
the Court applies the equal protection test applicable to the given facts.
What test will be used depends upon the group as well as the rights which
are affected. Generally, the Court has used a "two-tiered" approach to
equal protection. The first tier demands that the legislative classification
bears only a rational relation to the governmental purpose.45 In these cases
the Court exercises only minimal scrutiny to determine whether the basis
for the classification is rational, which effectively amounts to no scrutiny
at all. 46 In the second tier, the Court exercises a much closer examination
of the classification, often termed "strict scrutiny." This heightened test
is used where the classification is "suspect"4 7 or when it infringes on a "fun-
45. In F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920), the Court set
out the test as follows:
the classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon
some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the ob-
ject of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be
treated alike.
Id. at 415.
That test was further diluted in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961),
where the Court said, "the constitutional safeguard is offended only if the clas-
sification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the state's ob-
jective. . . . A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any states of facts
reasonably may be conceived to justify it." Id. at 425-26. In Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911), four principles were articulated which char-
acterized the equal protection clause:
1. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment does not take
from the State the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but
admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and
avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis and
therefore is purely arbitrary.
2. A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against
that clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety or
because in practice it results in some inequality.
3. When the classification in such a law is called into question, if any state
of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence
of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed.
4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden
of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essen-
tially arbitrary.
Id. at 78-79.
46. See Note, The Less Restrictive Alternative in Constitutional Adjudication:
An Analysis, A Justification, and Some Criteria, 27 VAND. L. REv. 995 (1974).
47. Classifications the Supreme Court has deemed "suspect" requiring strict
scrutiny are those based on race, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); alienage,
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); and nationality, Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). It can also be argued that "suspect" classifications in-
clude sex, Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71 (1971); see Note, Tax Benefits for Widows, the Supreme Court's Attitude Toward
792 [Vol. 24:784
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damental interest."'48  In these cases the classification must "be necessary
to promote a compelling governmental interest,"'49 otherwise it will be held
unconstitutional.
The "two-tiered" formula of equal protection seems to leave all classifi-
cations which fail to touch suspect criteria or fundamental interests free
from judicial intervention. In response to the dissatisfaction with the "two-
,tiered" formulation, the Burger Court has introduced the "means-scrutiny"
approach to equal protection. 0 The court of appeals in Belle Terre used
this approach and ultimately found the village ordinance unconstitutional.
The court of appeals characterized the new approach as one "which
permits consideration to be given to evidence of the nature of the unequal
classification under attack, the nature of the rights adversely affected, and
the governmental interest urged in support of it."'51 The test was "whether
the legislative classification is in fact substantially related to the object of
the statute."'52 This approach seems to offer more protection for an indi-
vidual's rights than the presumption of the legislation's validity under mini-
mal scrutiny.
The Supreme Court in Belle Terre failed to apply the court of appeals
"flexible" approach or any other middle ground equal protection theory. 53
Instead the Justices relied on a "minimal scrutiny" approach 54 which they
viewed as particularly applicable to the zoning area where local legisla-
tures have generally been given a free rein.5 5 This approach seems ap-
propriate in light of the Court's recent opinion in San Antonio School Dis-
Remedial Sex Legislation-Kahn v. Shevin, 24 DEPAvL L. REV. 797 (1975); wealth,
San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); and illegitimacy, Weber v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
48. The list of "fundamental interests" requiring strict scrutiny include the right
to privacy, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); the right to travel, Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); the right of procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535 (1942); the right to essentials necessary to bring a criminal appeal, Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); and the right to vote, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elec-
tions, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
49. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
50. See notes 17 & 18 supra.
51. 476 F.2d 806 at 814.
52. Id. at 814.
53. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's discontent with the "two-tiered" ap-
proach and its development of a new middle ground scrutiny, see Note, Tax Benefits
for Widows, the Supreme Court's Attitude Toward Remedial Sex Legislation-Kahn
v. Shevin, 24 DEPAUL L. REV. 797, nn.16-32 and accompanying text (1975).
54. 416 U.S. 1 at 8; see note 10 supra.
55. 416 U.S. at 3'-6.
1975] 793
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
trict v. Rodriguez,56 which rejected an equal protection attack on interdis-
trict inequalities in school financing. There, too, the Court felt it must
defer to the state legislature in an area where the legislature has tradi-
tionally been given great discretion. The Court admitted that it "lack[s]
both the expertise and the familiarity with local problems so necessary to
the making of wise decisions,' '5 7 and that "[i]n such a complex arena in
which no perfect alternatives exist, the Court does well not to impose too
rigorous a standard of scrutiny. ... 58
The Supreme Court, in Belle Terre, refrained from imposing strict scru-
tiny, and deferred to the state legislature in an area where the legislature
has traditionally been given a free hand. The issue is the effect upon the
rights of the individuals involved. As Justice Marshall, in his Belle Terre
dissent, said, ". . . deference does not mean abdication. This Court has
an obligation to ensure that zoning ordinances . . .do not infringe upon
fundamental constitutional rights." 59 Yet, Belle Terre seems to put tra-
ditional zoning concerns and "fundamental interests" on their respective
sides of the scale of justice with zoning objectives clearly coming out the
more weighty of the considerations.
While Rodriguez and Belle Terre are compatible, a case decided prior
to Belle Terre and which remains at odds with it is United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture v. Moreno.6 0 There the Supreme Court found a pro-
vision in the Food Stamp Act, which denied federal food stamp assistance
to households in which all the members were not related, a violation of
equal protection. 61 Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion said, "[t]he
'unrelated' person provision . . . has an impact on the rights of people
to associate for lawful purposes with whom they choose. When state ac-
tion 'may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate' it 'is sub-
ject to the closest scrutiny.' "62 Yet, Justice Douglas, who spoke for the
majority in Belle Terre, said in reference to a similar ordinance that it
"involves no 'fundamental' right guaranteed by the Constitution ...
56. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
57. Id. at 41.
58. Id.
59. 416 U.S. 1, 14 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
60. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
61. But see Note, United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno-The "Red
Herring" of Social Welfare, 23 DEPAUL L. R.V. 1485, 1495-98, where it is sug-
gested that the Burger Court, as evidenced by United States Dep't of Agric. v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, takes a more liberal attitude toward politically unpopular
groups, e.g., "hippy communes."
62. United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 544 (1973).
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[such as] . . . the right of association."' 63  This apparent change of posi-
tion is in keeping with the Burger Court's tendency to defer to local gov-
ernments in many areas and in particular to keep zoning law an exclusive
domain for the state. This probably explains the Court's failure in Belle
Terre to apply the greater degree of scrutiny employed in Moreno.64 If
the Court recognized the fundamental right of association of the appellees
in Belle Terre, it would be forced to find the family zoning ordinance un-
constitutional and thereby break with traditional Euclid zoning theory.
Belle Terre might also be explained as the manifestation of the Justices'
views on communal living arrangements.6 5 Clearly, the decision is a vic-
tory for exclusionary zoning as it affects the plight of non-traditional or
voluntary families. The single-family ordinance originally designed to
regulate building structure has, especially since Belle Terre, become an ef-
fective instrument of social control. 66 While Belle Terre does not ex-
pressly give preference for traditional families, it does so by implication.
The Court says, ".[T]he provision of the ordinance bringing within the defi-
nition of a 'family' two unmarried people belies the charge . . . that the
ordinance. . . reeks with an animosity to unmarried couples who live to-
gether."' 67 Yet two unmarried people living together is clearly the most
traditional of non-traditional living arrangements. The decison also com-
ments on family values and youth values, stating "[a] quiet place where
yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted are legitimate
guidelines in a land use project addressed to family needs." 68
The Court further seems to imply that non-traditional households are
larger than traditional households, thus creating crowds, noise and traf-
fic.69 Yet, statistics show the average size of a household, which is de-
fined to include a voluntary family, at 3.01 persons in 1973, compared
to 3.48 persons for a traditional family and 3.55 persons per household
in the Village of Belle Terre.70  If the Court had applied a heightened
63. 416 U.S. 1, 7 (1974). But see Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972),
where Justice Douglas in his dissenting opinion said, 'The home-whether rented or
owned-is the very heart of privacy in modem America." "The 'rational' relation-
ship test applied to strictly economic or business interests . . . is not germane here."
Id. at 81-82 & n.5.
64. Note, supra note 61, at 1488, 1494.
65. See note 61 supra.
66. See Note, 23 HAST. L.J. 1459, 1464 (1972); see also Note, 7 HARv. Civ.
RiGsrrs-Civ. Lm. L. Rnv. 393, 394-95 (1972).
67. 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974).
68. Id. at 9.
69. Id.
70. Statistical Abstract of United States, United States Department of Commerce,
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scrutiny to the classification which the ordinance created, it would have
taken these statistics into consideration. As Justice Marshall, in his
dissent, noted, "[t]here is not a shred of evidence in the record indicating
that if Belle Terre permitted a limited number of unrelated persons to live
together, the residential, familial character of the community would be
fundamentally affected. ' '71
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Belle Terre has indicated that traditional zoning
concerns under the auspices of state police power, take preference over the
fundamental rights of association and privacy. In light of the Court's
articulation of a strong policy of deference to the local legislature in zoning
matters, it is doubtful whether it will agree to adjudicate an exclusionary
zoning case in the near future.
However, state courts have yet to take an adamant stand on the issue.
72
In the past, the state courts have had a liberal attitude as to what consti-
tuted a "family" 7 which may still persist despite the adverse result in Belle
Terre. These courts may help perpetuate the movement against exclu-
sionary zoning in the non-traditional family sphere.
Michael A. Haber
Bureau of Census p. 40 (1974). Household is defined as that which comprises:
all persons who occupy a "housing unit," that is, a house, an apartment or
other group of rooms, or a room that constitutes "separate living quarters."
A household includes the related family members and all the unrelated per-
sons, if any, such as lodgers, foster children, wards, or employees who share
the housing unit. A person living alone or a group of unrelated persons
sharing the same housing unit as partners also counted as household.
Id. at 3.
Family is defined as:
a group of two or more persons related by blood, marriage, or adoption and
residing together in a household. A primary family consists of the head
of a household and all other persons in the household related to the bead.
A secondary family comprises two or more persons such as guests, lodgers,
or resident employees and their relatives, living in a household and related
to each other.
Id. If Belle Terre has a population of 700 and consists of 220 homes, the average
population per household is 3.55. 416 U.S. 1, 2 (1974).
71. 416 U.S. 1, 20 (1974).
72. In City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 313 N.E.2d 756 (1974),
decided after Belle Terre, the court invalidated a single-family ordinance which re-
strictively defined family and implied that a voluntary family which was a permanent
living arrangement could not be deprived residence in a single-family dwelling. The
court distinguished Belle Terre because there the Court dealt with a "temporary living
arrangement." Id. at 304-05, 313 N.E.2d at 758. See text accompanying notes 35-
37, supra.
73. See text accompanying notes 31-41, supra.
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